

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1962

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~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tentative Agenda for off-the-record NSC Meeting, October 21, 1962, 2:30 p.m.

A. Introduction - New Intelligence (CIA)

B. Substantial issues in the President's speech
(third draft will be circulated at the meeting)

- Challenges to
Sov. Navy
Targeting
Mines
- ✓ 1. How explicit should the description of Soviet installations be?
 - x 2. Is this a "nuclear quarantine" or a "blockade" or something in between?
 - ✓ 3. Do we wish to be clear or unclear on the relation between our blockade decision and OAS action?
 4. Is the Caribbean meeting a sufficiently strong addition to include?
 5. Is the phrasing of the willingness to meet Khrushchev as we want it?
 6. How far should we give explicit warning on Berlin?

→ C. The diplomatic track before the speech (designated as P-Hour and expected to be Monday evening) (Department of State)

The Department of State will summarize the messages and messengers, with particular reference to the message to Khrushchev.

→ D. Military arrangements (Defense Department)

1. The method of naval blockade
2. The problem of the first shot
3. Plans for surveillance

OPERATING DOCUMENTS: PROCLAMATIONS, ETC.
Berlin planning (Department of State)

1. Proposal for high-level statement on Tuesday on differences between Berlin and Cuba
2. Plans for supporting public statements by Europeans
3. Plans for intensified Berlin contingency planning

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CLERK (NWC-78-626)
NARS, DATE 6/1/79

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 21, 1962

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVETentative Agenda for off-the-record NSC Meeting, October 21, 1962, 2:30 p.m.A. Introduction - New Intelligence (CIA)B. Substantive issues in the President's speech
(third draft will be circulated at the meeting)

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D. Military arrangements (Defense Department)

1. The method of naval blockade
2. The problem of the first shot
3. Plans for surveillance

signs - shot over land - shot into ship

E. Berlin planning (Department of State)

1. Proposal for high-level statement on Tuesday on differences between Berlin and Cuba
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2. Is this a "nuclear quarantine" or a "blockade" or something in between?
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4. Is the Caribbean meeting a sufficiently strong addition to include?
5. Is the phrasing of the willingness to meet Khrushchev as we want it?
6. How far should we give explicit warning on Berlin?
7. *Partial Contingency?*

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BY [signature] NARS, DATE 6/1/79